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ABSTRACT
Carbon offsetting remains contentious within, at
least, philosophy. By posing and then answering a
general question about an aspect of the morality of
carbon offsetting—Does carbon offsetting make lux-
ury emissions morally permissible?—this essay helps
to lessen some of the topic’s contentiousness. Its
central question is answered by arguing and
defending the view that carbon offsetting makes
luxury emissions morally permissible by counteract-
ing potential harm. This essay then shows how this
argument links to and offers a common starting
point for further examination of offsetting across
various disciplines and domains, such as policy and
other branches of philosophy like the ethics of risk.
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Carbon offsetting remains contentious within, at least, philosophy
(Aldred, 2012; Caney, 2010; Goodin, 1994; Page, 2011, 2013; Watt,
2021).1 By posing and then answering a general question about an aspect
of the morality of carbon offsetting—Does carbon offsetting make luxury
emissions morally permissible?—this essay helps to lessen some of the
topic’s contentiousness. Its central question is answered by arguing and
defending the view that carbon offsetting makes luxury emissions morally
permissible by counteracting potential harm. This essay then shows how
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this argument links to and offers a common starting point for further
examination of offsetting across various disciplines and domains, such as
policy and other branches of philosophy like the ethics of risk.
This essay is organized in the following way. To help clarify the issues sur-
rounding the morality of carbon offsetting, section “Preliminaries” briefly
outlines and defines main topics and terms. Section “Defense” answers the
central question by showing how carbon offsetting makes luxury emitting
morally permissible. Section “Transdisciplinary applications” examines the
ways this conclusion applies to disciplines and domains. A short conclusion
ends this works.
Preliminaries
This work relies on Hyams and Fawcett’s (2013) characterization of car-
bon offsetting as “a mechanism by which an organization or individual
contributes to a scheme that is projected either to remove carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere or to deliver carbon dioxide emission reductions on
the part of other organizations or individuals” (91). Commonly, but not
exclusively, emissions are offset through reforestation, afforestation, and
emissions-capture projects (Dodds et al., 2012, p. 31). The typology of
offsetting, broadly described here, includes two forms—regulatory and
voluntary. Regulatory schemes allow organizations to comply with limits
on carbon emissions through a regulatory carbon market (G€ossling et al.,
2007, p. 226). These schemes fall under the control of various regimes,
such as the Kyoto Protocol and EU Emissions Trading Scheme (Corbera
et al., 2009, p. 25–27). Voluntary schemes enable individuals to purchase
and offset their personal CO2 emissions (G€ossling et al., 2007, p. 227). As
indicated at the outset, this work only focuses on voluntary offsetting.
The moral permissibility of carbon offsetting comes down to whether
(something like) the following working thesis is true: it is sometimes mor-
ally permissible to do harm if that harm is offset by doing good. In other
words, which describe offsetting in moral terms, doing good offsets doing
or having done harm, and that good/harm calculus, when the good neu-
tralizes or outweighs the harm, can permit an otherwise impermis-
sible action.
It is worthwhile to consider the workings of moral offsetting generally
even though this essay will not attempt to defend the moral permissibility
of all possible examples of offsetting. Some moral theories, in at least cari-
catured forms, may commit their adherents to accepting very counter-
intuitive outcomes of what, on its face, appears to be offsetting. For
example, as Judith Jarvis Thompson (1985, p. 1396) presented, the act
consequentialist assents to vivisecting a homeless person if using the res-
cued organs would extend life to five others. This kind of apparently
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morally impermissible outcome highlights the need for restricting the
breadth of the offsetting thesis.
Foerster (2019) presents three limiting conditions to offsetting (i.e.
what counts as offsetting must meet these conditions), which will also
guide the argument below. These conditions, by stipulation, must all be
satisfied for doing good to offset doing harm. First, the Harm
Condition—the harm is harm even when done in conjunction with the
good—must obtain. Second, the Avoidability Condition—it is possible to
do good without doing harm—must also obtain. Third, the Motivation
Condition—the good is done to offset the harm—must obtain, too.
Let’s look at Foerster’s conditions in more detail, both to see the work
they do and because they will be important for subsequent argument. The
Harm Condition excludes cases that may putatively offset but are morally
uninteresting. Foerster gives an example of soccer practice, where a par-
ent drops off her child for soccer practice and picks up the child once
practice is over (i.e. picking the kid up offsets an otherwise non-harming
act of dropping the kid off).
The Avoidability Condition sifts out cases of doing harm from neces-
sity in order to do good from those of (the morally questionable) offset-
ting, in which harm is avoidable but done with putatively
counterbalancing good actions that follow. The Motivation Condition
underscores that offsetting is not happenstance; rather, doing good is
meant to counteract having done harm. In light of the three conditions,
Thompson’s example of the homeless person being sliced up for the
benefit of saving others does not fit within the offsetting paradigm—the
Motivation Condition does not obtain.
We can return to the topic of carbon offsetting for luxury emissions.
For conceptual and terminological clarification, we rely on Henry Shue’s
(1993) oft-used distinction between luxury and subsistence emissions.
Whereas subsistence emissions are “essential and even urgent for the ful-
fillment of vital needs,” luxury emissions are “inessential for either sur-
vival or decency” (1993, 55). There are some straightforward instances of
each sort (even considering debate about the distinction’s exact bounda-
ries and thresholds) (Baatz, 2014; Hayward, 2007; McLaughlin, 2019;
Schlosberg, 2019). For example, subsistence CO2 emissions include those
produced by a household when preparing hot food.2 A contrastive
example of luxury emissions are those arising from taking a Sunday drive
in a gas-guzzling SUV for no other reason or purpose than to “spin the
wheels” or cruise around.3 Luxury emissions, then, do not comprise those
necessary for securing vital needs.
The above examples do some work to illuminate the conceptual dis-
tinctiveness of these types of emissions. Perhaps the paradigmatic real-
world examples of luxury emissions are those from leisure passenger air
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travel (G€ossling et al., 2019, p. 2–5). Furthermore, many airlines, ticket
services, and travel agencies offer carbon offsetting options, where passen-
gers can pay to neutralize CO2 emissions from their respective shares of
a flight’s total CO2 emissions (Dodds et al., 2008). Although we return to
these points later, it bears noting here that, among other reasons, air trav-
el’s major contributions to CO2 emissions coupled with its widespread
availability and use spurs policy making as well as philosophical
examination.
In addition to the above assumptions, we reject Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong’s view that luxury emissions from a lone individual’s luxury
emissions cannot tilt the balance enough to be consequential (Sinnott-
Armstrong, 2005, p. 311). In other words, we claim that an individual’s
luxury emissions can contribute in a non-negligible or difference-making
way to total CO2 emissions, such that they could potentially generate
harm. Without this assumption, however, the discussion of the moral im/
permissibility of luxury emissions has no bite, with a knock-on effect for
many instances of carbon offsetting—absent (potential) harm there are no
grounds for offsetting. In this respect, the more challenging argument
against carbon offsetting is to assume there is harm in individual lux-
ury emissions.
Notice that while we assume this type of individual difference, the per-
spective has a substantial literature supporting it (Almassi, 2012;
Gunnemyr, 2019; Hourdequin, 2010; Sandberg, 2011; Sandler, 2010;
Zoller, 2015). The scope of this work does not allow for a complete argu-
ment in favor of this position, which is another reason to assume it.
However, a brief defense is that, as John Broome notes, an average person
from a rich country born in 1950 will emit around 800 tons in a lifetime
(2012, p. 74). There are different ways to show the harmfulness of such
individual emissions. Based on the World Health Organization’s pub-
lished estimates of the number of deaths and amount of disease that will
be caused by global warming, Broome gives a rough estimate that an
individual’s lifetime emissions will wipe out more than six months of
healthy human life (2012, p. 74). Other theorists, such as Nolt (2011) and
Hiller (2011), also argue against the inconsequantialism of personal indi-
vidual emissions on the basis of the very consequential harmful impact of
individuals’ personal emissions over the course of a lifetime or as derived
from lifetime emissions.
There is an additional reason for assuming the above individual dif-
ference-making notion; namely, there is at least an intuitive conflict
between luxury emitting and doing what is morally permissible.
Sidestepping this sizeable discussion enables a more direct path to
addressing whether one solution—carbon offsetting—can quell this
intuitive conflict.
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Now, these preceding remarks (i.e. definitions, assumptions, explan-
ation) highlight another assumption: carbon offsetting is an example of
moral offsetting. Whether the argument below about carbon offsetting
holds for or readily applies to other moral offsetting examples is not
examined. Still, a lingering question remains vis-a-vis the morality of car-
bon offsetting; namely, what is being morally offset? Here, the assertion,
which needs defending, is that a potential harm—the outcome of
increased CO2 emissions—is offset (counteracted through reduction or
nullification) by a countervailing removal of such emissions.
The countervailing good described above is assumed to be genuine.
That is, it is assumed that the carbon offsetting scheme will in fact
remove or prevent an increase in total CO2 emissions from the atmos-
phere (Broome 2012, Ch. 5). Furthermore, genuine, countervailing good
assumes that any offsetting scheme instantiates principles of justice, such
as those described by Caney (2010), McKinnon (2015), or Spiekermann
(2014). Making this assumption about genuineness, including the princi-
ples of justice, does not weaken this work’s core claim—carbon offsetting
makes luxury emissions permissible—rather, it indicates a high bar that
carbon offsets must reach in order to be permissible.
Taking the preceding remarks into account, the working thesis—it is
sometimes morally permissible to do harm if it is offset by doing good—
can be amended. The thesis defended below is the following: it is morally
permissible to luxury emit CO2 if such luxury CO2 emissions are coun-
teracted by (genuine) carbon offsetting. Having identified the meaning of
key terms, identified the basics of moral offsetting in general, announced
assumptions that will carry forward throughout subsequent discussion,
and refined the thesis to be defended, the next section is devoted to argu-
ing for the position outlined.
Defense
The moral problem with carbon offsetting seems, at its root, to consist of
the following dilemma: how can the harm of luxury CO2 emissions be
counteracted by good such that luxury emitting is morally permissible?
Some critics of offsetting cast the individual duty to do no (unnecessary)
harm in terms of desisting from luxury emitting altogether. Rather than
emit and equalize through offsets, an individual does not (luxury) emit at
all. The desistance solution to emissions is, by all accounts, a morally per-
missible one; however, it does not conflict with or undermine the moral
permissibility of offsetting. That is, not emitting is a better option, but it
is an option that, in itself, cannot impugn the permissibility of car-
bon offsetting.
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What makes carbon offsetting (understood in qualified terms set out
in the preceding section) permissible is that it does not increase an indi-
vidual’s contribution to total CO2 emissions. Consider a flyer, Passenger
A, who purchases a carbon offset equal to the total CO2 emission ton-
nage for a third vacation flight in as many months from Buenos Aires to
Caracas. This offset keeps Passenger A’s total CO2 emissions equal to
what they would have been had the flyer not flown at all. In other words,
Passenger A makes no difference.
The above example is, by hypothesis, genuine and, as such, the duty to
do no harm is met. This canceling effect, however, comes in for criticism
(Goodin, 1994). Some criticism, as Julia Driver (2014) points out, arises
from conflating otherwise distinctive wrongs. In contrast to intrinsic
wrongs, such as disrespecting individual persons, carbon emissions are
“instrumentally wrong since they generate harms” (Driver, 2014, p. 168).
Above it was assumed that an individual’s luxury emissions can but do
not necessarily affect CO2 emission totals in a non-negligible way. They
are harms to be avoided; however, they are not intrinsically wrong.
Contra arguments from Goodin (1994, p. 582), the carbon offset does
not address an environmental wrong (putatively intrinsically wrong)
through compensatory financial payment (i.e. an ill-matched remedy for
the wrong produced). The carbon offset finances a means by which a
(potential) wrong is counteracted. The difference is vital. Put simply, car-
bon offsets are not an economic side-constraint that, once paid, allow a
user to pollute. Carbon offsets are a nullification of harm that a luxury
emitter would otherwise cause or contribute to the cause. The negative
outcome (harm and/or wrong) of an action (luxury emitting in its mani-
fold forms) is avoided, rendering all things equal to the state of affairs
before the luxury emission.
The strategy of defending the moral permissibility of carbon offsets for
luxury emissions in general comes down to (a) the assumptions in the
preceding section holding and (b) the stipulated limiting conditions of
offsetting being met. In any a given example of carbon offsetting luxury
emissions, such as Passenger A above, both (a) and (b) must obtain to be
morally permissible. To answer the question that opened this section,
then, the harm of luxury carbon emissions are morally permissible inas-
much as certain facts of given cases obtain to render such harm neutral.
The instrumental (not intrinsic) wrongness of luxury carbon emissions is
also amongst those facts.
The sequence of events also matters. The defensibility of luxury emissions
as morally permissible turns in part on offsetting counteracting expected
harm, rather than remedying harm that has occurred. In this respect, doing
no harm comes about through prophylactically countering harm that luxury
emitting may generate. As discussed above, but worth mentioning here again,
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such prophylactic measures would not work for intrinsic wrongs—in rather
absurd terms, giving birth to a human being does not offset killing another
human being, prophylactically or otherwise.
A legitimate challenge to this defense of offsetting’s permissibility is
that carbon offsets only imperfectly account for harm (Kamm, 2006).
Consider an iteration of this imperfect correspondence: Passenger A’s
flight from Buenos Aires to Caracas contributes to an increase in asthma
cases of those persons living under its flight path. The resolution to this
sort of imperfect correspondence case, where carbon offsetting only coun-
teracts one sort of harm (of which there are multiple), is that some activ-
ities may be impermissible for other reasons (Lawford-Smith and
Tuckwell, 2020, p. 5). Carbon offsetting is meant to counteract the harm
associated with climate change.
Notice that this sort of case does not represent a mark against carbon
offsetting since the offsetting is presumed to deliver on its reduction
promise. It may, however, represent a mark against a practice that
increases a variety of other risks, only some of which carbon offsetting
counteracts. This defense is contingent on the practice in question—lux-
ury emitting by flying or taking a Sunday drive or burning coal when
less-emission-producing alternatives are available, etc. However, such con-
tingency underscores (when it does) that ensuring moral permissibility by
means of carbon offsetting has its limits. This tracks common sense
moral intuitions. Carbon offsetting is not an appropriate corrective, nor
does offsetting make this permissible.
Transdisciplinary Applications
This section highlights how the philosophical argument for the moral
permissibility of carbon offsetting luxury emissions applies to other disci-
plines and domains. In other words, it illuminates possible applications of
the main philosophical argument and identifies some of its transdiscipli-
nary breadth. Given this work’s scope, it is impossible to set out anything
nearing a complete taxonomy of such domains. This section instead
focuses on two areas in which there is apparent applicability—policy and
other philosophical topics. To highlight the cross-cutting features of this
essay’s central argument and conclusion (and related issues), this section
underscores how policy and the ethics of risk can use and possibly extend
the argument.
Developing and implementing policy for offsetting luxury emissions is
complex. Among other things, it requires attention to the various features
and assumptions that make carbon offsetting morally permissible in the
first place. The complexities of carbon offsetting policy are markedly
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similar to those that attend policy making and implementation generally,
as well as environmental policy specifically.
Policy must contend with foundational philosophical issues—such as
whether there is an ethical case for carbon offsetting, which the above
discussion and argument shows there is (Wolff, 2011, p. 4–7). Such issues
also include assessing empirical details about if and how particular offset-
ting schemes achieve requisite conditions and desired effects (e.g. genuine
neutralization of CO2 emissions) (Weale, 2019, p. 51–53). In addition,
they include legal facts about policy makers and their powers (whether
national, supranational, international, or otherwise), as well as democratic
legitimacy (Howard, 2019). The policy challenges of carbon offsetting,
then, include but do not stop at philosophical problems. However, con-
forming to the core argument about the moral permissibility of carbon
offsetting luxury emissions is a sine qua non of any policy (Howard,
2019, p. 32–33). Furthermore, as we see it, this essay’s central argument
helps to justify the inclusion of offsetting as an option for policies aimed
at mitigating climate change.
Within policy, carbon offsetting is also to be considered in terms of
efficacy, efficiency, and alternative options. Such alternatives may deliver
better results—for example, reducing other possible harms or more effi-
ciently achieving a policy goal. The empirical issues link back to and
potentially expose yet other philosophical issues to address (Weale, 2019,
p. 51–53). In this sense, what is morally permissible—carbon offsetting
luxury emissions—might not be morally preferable when considering a
wider range of benefits and burdens following from other, non-offsetting
policy options.
Consider a real-world instance, such as Article 36 of 2021 national
legislation in France designed to combat climate change and strengthen
resilience to its effects.4 To reduce CO2 emissions, Article 36 bans
domestic flights of less than two-and-a-half hours long that are serviced
by train connections (with comparable pricing to flights). One way to
view Article 36 is that France’s National Assembly opted to eliminate
CO2 emissions rather than require them to be offset. That is, the legisla-
tion bans flights even though enacting carbon offsetting policy measures
would presumably yield equivalent results vis-a-vis luxury emissions (and
subsistence emissions as well).
Let’s look at some of the complications of carbon offsetting in such a
policy. First, as previously noted, other possible harms generated are
reduced through the flights’ elimination. Furthermore, inequities that car-
bon offsets might abet, depending on their pricing, would be avoided. If
flights become so expensive because of offsetting costs, making them pur-
chasable by relatively few wealthy individuals, then the burden of this
policy could outweigh its benefits. Also, quite simply, halting all domestic
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flights of less than two-and-a-half hours may more efficiently reduce CO2
emissions than carbon offsets and thereby more greatly benefit the public
good. Notice that even if banning flights proves more efficient in the
Article 36 defined use case, carbon offsets could still play an important
complementary role—for example, as an option offered for leisure train
travel, or possibly even a requirement of leisure train travel. In this way,
additional carbon neutralization could be achieved.
None of the above affects the argument establishing the morality of
carbon offsetting. Furthermore, the viability of offsetting as one tool to
combat climate change is potentially heightened when used in a comple-
mentary approach to neutralize emissions (i.e. with other mitigation
measures). Ultimately, what policy must contend with is not determining
whether carbon offsetting in theory is morally permissible, but rather
how to ensure that it achieves needs and goals whilst remaining morally
permissible in practice. This opens additional lines of research to be
investigated.
From the vantage point of other philosophical topics, carbon offsetting
and offsetting generally open novel possibilities for addressing thorny
problems. The central argument of this work exclusively focuses on a
question about the morality of carbon offsetting for luxury emissions;
however, emissions generally increase a variety of risks to the environ-
ment and health, among other things. The ways in which offsetting can
help solve and tackle such risks, at least with respect to their philosoph-
ical dimensions, most evidently falls under the purview of the ethics
of risk.
Defined canonically, the ethics of risk is the “branch of moral philoso-
phy that enquires into the principles that should morally guide choice in
circumstances where the outcome of some possible course of action is
not known” (Altham, 1984, p. 15). A central challenge within the ethics
of risk is how to cope with risk not simply as “an ‘unfortunate aspect’ of
contemporary social life, but a fundamental empirical circumstance of
any society, present and future” (Erman & M€oller, 2018). There is need
to guide individual (and collective) action in ways that ameliorate
unwanted risks. The full range of possible applications of offsetting,
explored in terms of their moral appeal and appropriateness, may help to
fill that need.
Offsetting does not seem designed or capable to answer the full array
of challenges of pervasive risk in society (one could, however, devise
plausible arguments indicating otherwise). It nevertheless represents a
means of negating at least some potential harms, luxury emission-caused
and otherwise. Offsetting can be considered in light of its potential to
reduce negative results that may follow from deciding and acting under
conditions of uncertainty. The hypothesis to be investigated, then, is that
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offsetting provides a possible avenue for prophylactically counteracting
negative results from risky decisions and actions (e.g. emitting).
Furthermore, how offsetting fits into a larger moral theory—utilitarian,
contractualist, deontological, etc.—to help meet the challenge of risks is
another area for examination (Foerster, 2019, p. 6–12).
A viable aim for the ethics of risk would be to integrate offsetting into
a wider theory of how to address risk through principles for action guid-
ance. The key point here is that offsetting may play a role in filling gaps
presented by risks. The narrower argument about the moral permissibility
of carbon offsetting not only enables consideration of offsetting as a prac-
ticable solution in other domains, but it also highlights that those other
domains may be much more widespread than just that of carbon
offsetting. Policy and the ethics of risk are just two domains considered;
however, their far-reaching impact at least highlights the extent to which
offsetting may go if fully integrated. Again, the common starting point
for any discipline to integrate offsetting is its standing as a morally per-
missible solution to (potential) harms, even if it might not always be the
morally preferable solution.
Conclusion
The preceding argument and defense highlights how an individual may
avoid doing harm in luxury emitting through carbon offsetting. The
moral permissibility of luxury emitting turns on a number of facts, in
absence of which there is reason to doubt the permissibility of luxury
emitting. The ground this argument clear is debates about whether it is
ever morally permissible to luxury emit. Removing some or all of the
assumptions and stipulations from this defense of the moral permissibility
of luxury emissions through carbon offsets could render luxury emissions
impermissible tout court, as some argue. However, identifying a basic
means by which luxury emissions are permissible draws a bright line
around any voluntary offsetting schemes. These schemes must reach a
high bar (of genuineness, justice, and so on) to be deemed morally per-
missible alternatives to desisting luxury emissions altogether. Taking all of
this into account, the extension and application of the argument’s conclu-
sion to other disciplines and domains opens novel possibilities for
addressing pernicious societal problems in theory and practice.
Notes
1. See this brief list of philosophical treatments (or analyses with philosophical
considerations included): (Aldred, 2012; Caney, 2010; Goodin, 1994; Page,
2011, 2013; Watt, 2021).
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2. See this list (though not exhaustive) from Qu et al. (2013), where subsistence
CO2 emissions are “the necessary emissions from the fundamental
consumption of the household, including the CO2 emissions due to use of
coal, LPG, gasoline and diesel oil, and the CO2 emissions from the
production, transportation and service processes of goods and services, such
as electricity, food, clothing, medicine and medical care subsistence
CO2 emissions.”
3. Qu et al. (2013) also provide a list of luxury emissions (from households);
they are “CO2 emissions due to the consumption of education, recreation,
transportation and communication services.”
4. See Project de Loi, portant lutte contre le dereglement climatique et
renforcement de la resilience face a ses effets [Bill to combat climate change
and build resilience to its effects], N 3875, Assemblee Nationale de la
Republique Française, February 10, 2021. https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/
dyn/15/dossiers/lutte_contre_le_dereglement_climatique?etape=15-AN1-
DEPOT. This bill is sometimes simply referred to as the Climate Law or
Climate Bill, and it consists of 126 articles aimed at reducing CO2 emissions
and improving the environment, among other things.
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